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A Critical Look at How Top Colleges and 
Universities are Adjudicating            
Sexual Assault 
TAMARA RICE LAVE* 
This Article examines the procedural protections af-
forded by the top American colleges and universities. After 
briefly situating these policies historically, it presents origi-
nal research on the procedural protections provided by the 
top twenty universities, top ten liberal arts colleges, and top 
five historically black colleges as ranked by U.S. News and 
World Reports. In 2015, university administrators were con-
tacted and asked a series of questions about the rights af-
forded to students, including the standard of proof, right to 
an adjudicatory hearing, right to confront and cross-exam-
ine witnesses, right to counsel, right to silence, and right to 
appeal. This Article describes the study’s findings and then 
compares them with prior studies. It then considers whether 
the disciplinary proceedings constitute state action, thus 
making them subject to constitutional scrutiny should they 
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be challenged in court. This Article concludes by briefly con-
sidering whether a student could successfully challenge 
these proceedings under contract law or Title IX. 
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People across the country are outraged by the way universities 
handle sexual assault.1 They argue that rape has become a pervasive 
problem on college campuses, and schools aren’t doing enough         
                                                                                                             
 1 See Kristen Lombardi, A Lack of Consequences for Sexual Assault, CTR. 
FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Feb. 24, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/
2010/02/24/4360/lack-consequences-sexual-assault; Kayla Webley, Big Shame 
on Campus, MARIE CLAIRE (Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.marieclaire.com/politics/
news/a8217/big-shame-on-campus/; Vanessa Grigoriadis, Meet the College 
Women Who Are Starting a Revolution Against Campus Sexual Assault, N.Y. 
MAG.: THE CUT (Sept. 21, 2014), http://nymag.com/thecut/2014/09/emma-sulko
wicz-campus-sexual-assault-activism.html. 
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to stop it.2 They rightfully point to cases like Sam Ukawuachu at 
Baylor University3 and Jameis Winston at Florida State University4 
as examples of universities prioritizing football over victim safety 
and offender accountability. They contend that the problem 
stretches beyond sports teams, with victims not being taken seri-
ously and even being dissuaded from pursuing charges in some 
cases.5 They argue that in the rare case a student is found responsi-
ble, he is not adequately punished.6 
President Obama listened to these concerns and made address-
ing campus sexual assault a priority of his presidency.7 In 2011, the 
Department of Education Office for Civil Rights (OCR) issued its 
Dear Colleague Letter (DCL), in which it called the statistics on sex-
ual violence “deeply troubling and a call to action for the nation.”8 
After reminding universities that sexual violence constitutes a form 
of discrimination under Title IX,9 OCR told universities that in order 
to be in compliance with Title IX, they had to change disciplinary 
proceedings to more effectively hold rapists accountable.10 In no un-
certain terms, it told universities that they had to reduce the standard 
of proof in disciplinary proceedings to a preponderance of the evi-
dence, and it strongly discouraged universities from allowing the 
                                                                                                             
 2 Webley, supra note 1. 
 3 Jessica Luther, Silence at Baylor, TEXAS MONTHLY (Aug. 20, 2015), http://
www.texasmonthly.com/article/silence-at- baylor/. 
 4 Walt Bogdanich, A Star Player Accused, and a Flawed Rape Investigation, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/04/16/
sports/errors-in-inquiry-on-rape-allegations-against-fsu-jameis-winston.html. 
 5 See id. 
 6 Lombardi, supra note 1. 
 7 Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Memorandum Es-
tablishing a White House Task Force to Protect Students from Sexual Assault 
(Jan. 22, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/22/memo-
randum-establishing-white-house-task-force-protect-students-sexual-a. 
 8 Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ., Office for Civil Rights, to Colleague 2 (Apr. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Dear 
Colleague Letter], http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-20
1104.pdf. 
 9 Id. at 1. 
 10 Id. at 1–3, 7–14. 
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parties to directly question one another.11 OCR threatened to with-
hold federal funding to universities that did not adequately comply12 
and it published a list of schools under investigation that continues 
to grow.13 OCR has found a number of schools to be in violation of 
Title IX, including Princeton University14 and Harvard Law 
School.15 These schools have since reached settlements with OCR, 
in which they agreed to change the way they handle sexual assault 
so as to meet the protocol set forth in the DCL.16 
Some applaud OCR’s efforts,17 including at least ninety profes-
sors who signed a White Paper in support of the DCL,18 but others 
contend that universities have gone too far in sacrificing the rights 
of the accused.19 Members of the law faculty at both Harvard and 
                                                                                                             
 11 Id. at 11–12. 
 12 Id. at 16. 
 13 See infra notes 86–109 and accompanying text. See also Press Office, U.S. 
Department of Education Releases List of Higher Education Institutions with 
Open Title IX Sexual Violence Investigations, DEP’T OF EDUC. (May 1, 2014), 
http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-releases-list-
higher-education-institutions-open-title-I [hereinafter DOE List]. 
 14 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Princeton University Found in Viola-
tion of Title IX, Reaches Agreement with U.S. Education Department to Address, 
Prevent Sexual Assault and Harassment of Students (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.
ed.gov/news/press-releases/princeton-university-found-violation-title-ix-reaches
-agreement-us-education-department-address-prevent-sexual-assault-and-harass-
ment-students [hereinafter Princeton Violation]. 
 15 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Harvard Law School Found in Viola-
tion of Title IX, Agrees to Remedy Sexual Harassment, including Sexual Assault 
of Students (Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/harvard-law-
school-found-violation-title-ix-agrees- remedy-sexual-harassment-including-sex-
ual-assault-students [hereinafter Harvard Violation]. 
 16 See Princeton Violation, supra note 14; see also Harvard Violation, supra 
note 15. 
 17 See Lavinia M. Weizel, Note, The Process That is Due: Preponderance of 
the Evidence as the Standard of Proof for University Adjudications of Student-on-
Student Sexual Assault Complaints, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1642–55 (2012); Amy 
Chmielewski, Note, Defending the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard in 
College Adjudications of Sexual Assault, BYU EDUC. & L.J. 143, 149–56 (2013). 
 18 Katherine K. Baker, Deborah L. Blake & Nancy Chi Cantalupo, et al., Title 
IX and the Preponderance of the Evidence: A White Paper, FEMINIST LAW 
PROFESSORS (Aug. 4, 2016), http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2016/08/Title-IX-Preponderance-White-Paper-signed-10.3.16.pdf. 
 19 See William A. Jacobson, Accused on Campus: Charges Dropped, But the 
Infamy Remains, LEGAL INSURRECTION (May 16, 2015, 8:30 PM), http://legal
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the University of Pennsylvania have publicly called for greater pro-
cedural rights.20 The popular press has also started to draw attention 
to the experiences of men who say their universities never gave them 
a meaningful chance to defend themselves before finding them re-
sponsible for sexual assault and expelling them.21  
Congress has also begun to take notice of the impact the DCL 
has had on college campuses.22 On January 7, 2016, Senator James 
Lankford, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Regulatory Affairs and 
Federal Management, U.S. Senate Committee on Government Af-
fairs and Homeland Security, wrote a letter to the Acting Secretary 
for the Department of Education (DOE) demanding that the DOE 
                                                                                                             
insurrection.com/2015/05/accused-on-campus-charges-dropped-but-the-infamy-
remains/; see also Naomi R. Shatz, Feminists, We Are Not Winning the War on 
Campus Sexual Assault, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 29, 2014, 6:44 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/naomi-shatz/feminists-we-are-not-winn_b_6071500.h
tml. See generally Stephen Henrick, A Hostile Environment for Student Defend-
ants: Title IX and Sexual Assault on College Campuses, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 49 
(2013); Barclay Sutton Hendrix, Note, A Feather on One Side, A Brick on the 
Other: Tilting the Scale Against Males Accused of Sexual Assault in Campus Dis-
ciplinary Proceedings, 47 GA. L. REV. 591, 594 (2013); Ryan D. Ellis, Mandating 
Injustice: The Preponderance of the Evidence Mandate Creates a New Threat to 
Due Process on Campus, 32 REV. LITIG. 65, 80–81 (2013). 
 20 See Elizabeth Bartholet et al., Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Pol-
icy, BOSTON GLOBE (Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014
/10/14/rethink-harvard-sexual-harassment-policy/HFDDiZN7nU2UwuUuWMn
qbM/story.html; David Rudovsky et al., Open Letter from Members of the Penn 
Law School Faculty, Sexual Assault Complaints: Protecting Complainants and 
the Accused Students at Universities, PHILLY.COM (Feb. 18, 2015), http://media.
philly.com/documents/OpenLetter.pdf. 
 21 See Tovia Smith, Some Accused of Sexual Assault on Campus Say System 
Works Against Them, NPR (Sept. 3, 2014, 3:31 AM), http://www.npr.org
/2014/09/03/345312997/some-accused-of-campus-assault-say-the-system-works
-against-them; see also Emily Yoffe, The College Rape Overcorrection, SLATE 
(Dec. 7, 2014, 11:53 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2014
/12/college_rape_campus_sexual_assault_is_a_serious_problem_but_the_ef-
forts.html; Teresa Watanabe, More College Men Are Fighting Back Against Sex-
ual Misconduct Cases, L.A. TIMES (June 7, 2014, 6:15 PM), http://www.latimes.
com/local/la-me-sexual-assault-legal-20140608-story.html. 
 22 See generally Letter from Senator James Lankford, Chairman, Subcommit-
tee on Regulatory Affairs and Fed. Mgmt., U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security and Gov’t Affairs, to The Hon. John B. King, Jr., Acting Sec’y, U.S. 
Dep’t of Educ. (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.lankford.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Sen.%20Lankford%20letter%20to%20Dept.%20of%20Education%201.7.16.
pdf. 
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provide statutory authority for the DCL.23 Although Catherine 
Lhamon, the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, provided a re-
sponse,24 Lankford declared it inadequate.25 
In addition, several courts across the country have found that 
current protections violate procedural due process.26 For example, 
in July 2015, a judge ordered the University of California, San Di-
ego to reverse the suspension of a male student because the discipli-
nary proceedings violated his due process rights,27 and nine months 
later, a different judge overturned the suspension of a University of 
Southern California student on the grounds that he was denied a fair 
hearing and the substantive evidence did not support the Appeal 
Panel’s findings.28 On March 31, 2016, the Massachusetts District 
Court ruled in favor of a Brandeis University student who had been 
found responsible for “serious sexual transgressions.”29 The court 
wrote, “Brandeis appears to have substantially impaired, if not elim-
inated, an accused student’s right to a fair and impartial process.”30    
The court was particularly troubled by the deprivation of the right to 
                                                                                                             
 23 Id. 
 24 Susan Kruth, OCR Response to Senator’s Inquiry Not All That Responsive, 
FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EDUC. (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.thefire.
org/ocr-response-to-senators-inquiry-not-all-that-responsive/. 
 25 Letter from Senator James Lankford, Chairman, Subcommittee on Regu-
latory Affairs and Fed. Mgmt., U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Gov’t Affairs, to The Hon. John B. King, Jr., Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. 
(Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.lankford.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/3.4.16%20Lank-
ford%20letter%20to%20Dept.%20of%20Education.pdf. 
 26 See Jake New, Court Wins for Accused, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 5, 
2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/11/05/more-students-punish
ed-over-sexual-assault-are-winning-lawsuits-against-colleges. 
 27 Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. San Diego, No. 37-2015-00010549-
CU-WM-CTL, 2015 WL 4394597, at *1, 5 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2015). 
 28 Doe v. Univ. of S. Cal., 200 Cal. Rptr. 3d 851, 855 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). 
 29 Doe v. Brandeis Univ., No. 15-11557-FDS, 2016 WL 1274533, at *4 (D. 
Mass. Mar. 31, 2016). 
 30  Id. at *6. 
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cross-examine31 as well as the lack of notice about the underlying 
allegations.32 
There is significant interest in campus sexual assault as evi-
denced by a recent Google search yielding over 18.3 million re-
sults.33 However, inadequate attention has been paid to the rights 
actually being afforded to students. A 1999 study by Berger and 
Berger looked at procedural protections in state and private univer-
sities, but it focused on cases of academic misconduct.34 In 2002, 
Karjane, Fisher, and Cullen conducted a study, funded by the De-
partment of Justice, into how institutions of higher education (IHEs) 
respond to sexual assault.35 Their study was extensive, and it in-
cluded a content analysis of published sexual assault policy materi-
als from a nationally representative sample.36 Although the scope of 
this work is extraordinary, it took place before the 2011 DCL and 
may not reflect current practices. 
This leaves a major gap in the literature, which this Article and 
a recently published companion article37 attempt to fill. Both pro-
vide a systematic description, based on original research, of the pro-
                                                                                                             
 31  Id. at *33–35 (“While protection of victims of sexual assault from unnec-
essary harassment is a laudable goal, the elimination of such a basic protection for 
the rights of the accused raises profound concerns. . . . Here, there were essentially 
no third-party witnesses to any of the events in question, and there does not appear 
to have been any contemporary corroborating evidence. The entire investigation 
thus turned on the credibility of the accuser and the accused. Under the circum-
stances, the lack of an opportunity for cross-examination may have had a very 
substantial effect on the fairness of the proceeding.”). 
 32 Id. at *33–34. 
 33 A Google search conducted on February 24, 2017 yielded 18,300,000 re-
sults. 
 34 Curtis J. Berger & Vivian Berger, Academic Discipline: A Guide to Fair 
Process for the University Student, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 289, 290–94 (1999). 
 35 HEATHER M. KARJANE, ET AL., Campus Sexual Assault: How America’s 
Institutions of Higher Education Respond vii (Oct. 2002), https://www.ncjrs.gov
/pdffiles1/nij/grants/196676.pdf. 
 36 Id. at vi. 
 37 Tamara Rice Lave, Ready, Fire, Aim: How Universities Are Failing the 
Constitution in Sexual Assault Cases, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 637 (2016). 
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cedural protections IHEs provide when a student is accused of sex-
ual assault.38 This Article focuses on the highest-ranked twenty uni-
versities, ten liberal arts colleges, and five historically black colleges 
as determined by U.S. News and World Reports. 
This Article begins by situating university disciplinary proceed-
ings legally and historically. It then moves to the central contribu-
tion—the study of procedural protections afforded at the top Amer-
ican colleges and universities. After describing research methods, 
this Article presents findings and compares them with prior studies. 
Next, it discusses whether these proceedings should be subject to 
constitutional scrutiny due to the coercive actions of the Department 
of Education. Finally, this Article considers whether students might 
be able to prevail on other grounds should courts determine that no 
state action exists. 
I.  LEGAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
On July 2, 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the 1964 
Civil Rights Act into law.39 Although much of the Act was aimed at 
preventing discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or na-
tional origin,40 Title VII—which banned workplace discrimina-
tion—specifically included sex as a protected class.41 Congress later 
extended the protection against sex discrimination to the classroom 
with Title IX.42 Enacted as part of the Educational Amendments of 
1972, Title IX barred sex discrimination in any education program 
or activity receiving federal financial assistance.43 Although there 
were exceptions, such as for fraternities, any institution that violated 
Title IX could lose federal funding.44 
                                                                                                             
 38 See id. 
 39 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 21 (2012)). 
 40 Id. (Title II (Injunctive Relief Against Discrimination in Places of Public 
Accommodation); Title III (Desegregation of Public Facilities); Title IV (Deseg-
regation of Public Education); Title VI (Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted 
Programs)). 
 41 Id. § 703(a)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012)). 
 42 Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, §§ 901–03, 86 Stat. 
235, 373–75 (1972) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012)). 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
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At first, the Supreme Court interpreted Title IX narrowly, hold-
ing that it did not apply to an entire institution, but solely to the par-
ticular program receiving federal assistance.45 Congress responded 
by enacting the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 to clarify the 
“broad application of title IX.”46 It explicitly extended Title IX to 
“all of the operations of . . . a college, university, or other postsec-
ondary institution, or a public system of higher education . . . any 
part of which is extended Federal financial assistance[.]”47 
In 1999, the Supreme Court held that Title IX extended to “stu-
dent-on-student sexual harassment, if sufficiently severe.”48 It then 
determined that a school could be held liable for monetary damages 
in a private lawsuit if one student sexually harasses another in the 
school’s program,49 but it repudiated the standard of liability set 
forth in OCR’s 1997 Guidance Document as insufficiently demand-
ing.50 Instead, the Supreme Court held that to prevail, the complain-
ant had to meet the conditions of notice and deliberate indifference 
set forth in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District.51 
                                                                                                             
 45 See Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1984). See also Trudy 
Saunders Bredthauer, Twenty-Five Years Under Title IX: Have We Made Pro-
gress?, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1107, 1108–09 (1998); Jollee Faber, Expanding 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 to Prohibit Student to Student Sex-
ual Harassment, 2 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 85, 113 n.119 (1992). 
 46 Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100–259, §187, §2(1), 
102 Stat. 28 (1988). 
 47 Id. § 908(2)(A). Note that the law actually reached more broadly, to extend, 
for instance, to “a department, agency, special purpose district, or other instru-
mentality of a State or of a local government.” Id. § 908(1)(A). 
 48 Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999). 
 49 Id. at 650–52. The Court had previously held in Franklin v. Gwinnet 
County Public Schools, that students had a private right to damages when their 
Title IX rights were violated. 503 U.S. 60, 65 (1992). 
 50 Davis, 526 U.S. at 651; Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Stu-
dents by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12034 
(Mar. 13, 1997) [hereinafter 1997 Guidance] (setting the standard of liability at 
“knows or should have known”). 
 51 Davis, 526 U.S. at 647–48, 641–42; see also Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998) (holding that to recover damages the plaintiff 
must prove “an official who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged 
discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the recipient’s behalf has 
actual knowledge of discrimination in the recipient’s programs” and “refuses to 
take action to bring the recipient into compliance.”). 
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These rulings extended the federal government’s power to police 
colleges and universities.52 As long as a school receives federal 
funding, the institution is required to comply with Title IX.53  Fed-
eral student loans count, which effectively makes every college and 
university subject to Title IX.54 And since institutions are now liable 
for the harassment of one student against another, they can at least 
theoretically no longer afford to ignore what happens in dorm rooms 
and fraternities.55 At the same time, however, the Court showed in 
Gebser that it would not hesitate to reign in the Department of Edu-
cation if the justices found its interpretation of Title IX deficient.56 
Despite the high standard of proof for liability, universities face 
significant lawsuits.57 United Educators (UE), which provides insur-
ance to 1,200-member universities, recently began offering insur-
ance to cover sexual assault payouts.58 Between 2006 and 2010, UE 
paid out $36 million; 72% of the settlements were provided to par-
ties suing the schools for incidents of sexual assault.59 In 2014, the 
University of Connecticut paid $1.28 million to settle a suit, and the 
University of Colorado at Boulder settled a suit for $825,000.60 
A. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights 
Congress explicitly left enforcement of Title IX in the hands of 
the departments and agencies that allocate federal funds to education 
programs and/or activities.61 These agencies were “authorized and 
directed” to effectuate the prohibition against sexual discrimina-
tion.62 They were supposed to do so “by issuing rules, regulations, 
                                                                                                             
 52 See generally Gebser, 524 U.S. at 274; Davis, 526 U.S. at 629. 
 53 Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 § 908(1)(A). 
 54 See Title IX Legal Manual, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.
gov/crt/title-ix#A.%C2%A0%20Federal%20Financial%20Assistance (last up-
dated Aug. 6, 2015). 
 55 See, e.g., Davis, 526 U.S. at 650. 
 56 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 280, 290–292. 
 57 Gayle Nelson, The High Cost of Sexual Assaults on College Campuses, 
NONPROFIT Q. (June 23, 2015) https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2015/06/23/the-high
-cost-of-sexual-assaults-on-college-campuses/. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Large Loss Report 2015, UNITED EDUCATORS (2015), https://www.ue.org
/uploadedFiles/Large_loss_2015_Final.pdf. 
 61 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2012). 
 62 Id. 
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or orders of general applicability[.]”63 Compliance with these rules 
could be achieved “(1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to 
continue assistance under such program or activity . . . or (2) by any 
other means authorized by law[.]”64 OCR has published three guides 
on how schools should adjudicate sexual cases.65 
1. THE 1997 OCR GUIDE 
In 1997, OCR published its first official guidance in the Federal 
Register on how schools should investigate and resolve allegations 
of sexual harassment.66 Before drafting the document, OCR met 
with representatives from interested parties, including students, 
teachers, school administrators, and researchers.67 It also twice pub-
licly requested comments.68 
In the 1997 guide, OCR enumerated certain factors that griev-
ance procedures should contain in order to be in compliance with 
Title IX.69 They included provisions providing for notice to students 
and other interested parties, such as “[a]dequate, reliable, and im-
partial investigation of complaints, including the opportunity to pre-
sent witnesses and other evidence”; “[d]esignated and reasonably 
prompt timeframes for the major stages of the complaint process”; 
notice of the outcome to the parties; and “[a]n assurance that the 
school will take steps to prevent reoccurrence of any harassment and 
to correct its discriminatory effects on the complainant and others, 
if appropriate.”70 OCR explicitly permitted schools to use a general 
student disciplinary procedure in responding to sexual harassment.71 
                                                                                                             
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 See generally 1997 Guidance, supra note 50; U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE 
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF 
STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES 3 (Jan. 
2001), https://www2.ed.gov/offices/OCR/archives/pdf/shguide.pdf [hereinafter 
2001 GUIDANCE]; Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 8. 
 66 1997 Guidance, supra note 50. 
 67 Id. at 12035. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 12044. 
 70 Id.  
 71 Id. at 12045. 
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The 1997 Guide also discussed the due process rights of the ac-
cused.72 OCR wrote: “The rights established under Title IX must be 
interpreted consistently with any federally guaranteed rights in-
volved in a complaint proceeding.”73 In addition to constitutional 
rights, OCR recognized that there could be additional rights created 
by state law, institutional regulations and policies, and collective 
bargaining.74 OCR emphasized that respecting the procedural rights 
of both parties was an important part of a just outcome: 
Indeed, procedures that ensure the Title IX rights of 
the complainant while at the same time according 
due process to both parties involved will lead to 
sound and supportable decisions. Schools should en-
sure that steps to accord due process rights do not re-
strict or unnecessarily delay the protections provided 
by Title IX to the complainant.75 
2. THE 2001 OCR GUIDE 
In 2001, OCR published a revised guide to sexual harassment 
under Title IX in the Federal Register principally in response to the 
Supreme Court’s rulings in Gebser and Davis.76 Just like the 1997 
Guide, the 2001 Guide went through notice and comment.77 Al-
though the Supreme Court had rejected the standard of liability ad-
vocated by OCR for liability in a private lawsuit, OCR emphasized 
that it still had the power to “‘promulgate and enforce requirements 
that effectuate [Title IX’s] nondiscrimination mandate,’ even in cir-
cumstances that would not give rise to a claim for money dam-
ages.”78 
The most important change to the section on adjudication of sex-
ual harassment complaints was an increased emphasis on the rights 
                                                                                                             
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 2001 GUIDANCE, supra note 65, at ii. In the 1997 Guide, OCR said that the 
standard of liability for monetary damages should be “knows or should have 
known[,]” a standard that was clearly rejected in Gebser. See 1997 Guidance, su-
pra note 50, at 12039. 
 77 2001 GUIDANCE, supra note 65, at ii. 
 78 Id. 
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of the accused.79 The 2001 Guide now had a section entitled, “Due 
Process Rights of the Accused.”80 In addition to being slightly reor-
ganized, this newly appointed section told schools that “the Family 
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) does not override federally pro-
tected due process rights of persons accused of sexual harass-
ment.”81 It concluded by saying: “Schools should be aware of these 
rights and their legal responsibilities to individuals accused of har-
assment.”82 
3. THE 2011 DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER 
In 2011, OCR issued what has come to be known as the Dear 
Colleague Letter, which OCR deemed to be a “significant guidance 
document.”83 OCR contended that the DCL “does not add require-
ments to applicable law, but provides information and examples to 
inform recipients about how OCR evaluates whether covered enti-
ties are complying with their legal obligations.”84 
Unlike the 1997 and 2001 Guide, OCR did not post a formal 
notice requesting feedback on the proposed changes.85 Yet it still 
laid out several recommendations and requirements in the DCL,86 
and two are of particular note. First, OCR strongly discouraged 
schools from allowing the parties to directly question one another.87 
Second, OCR told schools that they “must use a preponderance of 
the evidence,”88 and it advised that the clear and convincing stand-
ard used by some schools violated Title IX.89 
                                                                                                             
 79 Id. at 22; see 1997 Guidance, supra note 50, at 12045. 
 80 Id. at 22. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 8, at 1 n.1. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. See also 1997 Guidance, supra note 50; 2001 GUIDANCE, supra note 
65. 
 86 See generally id. For a detailed discussion of all the changes, see generally 
Tamara Rice Lave, Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication: Why Universities 
Should Reject the Dear Colleague Letter, 64 KAN. L. REV. 915 (2016) [hereinafter 
Reject the Dear Colleague Letter]. 
 87 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 8, at 12. 
 88 Id. at 11. 
 89 Id. 
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OCR justified reducing the standard of proof to preponderance 
on the ground that it was the standard used in Title VII hearings.90 
The difficulty with this justification, however, was that OCR did not 
also adopt Title VII protections that would have benefited the ac-
cused.91 For instance, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 gives both parties 
in a Title VII case the right to a jury trial if one party requests com-
pensatory or punitive damages.92 The right to trial means that both 
parties enjoy a panoply of other protections such as the right to coun-
sel and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. Not only 
did OCR not mandate that these Title VII rights be provided, but it 
also affirmatively recommended against some of them.93 For in-
stance, OCR strongly discouraged schools from allowing the parties 
to directly question one another, and it did not suggest any alterna-
tive.94 
B. Enforcement 
Although a university has never lost federal funding for violat-
ing Title IX,95 DOE has been taking a more aggressive stance.96 As 
mentioned above, OCR has found a number of schools to be in vio-
lation of Title IX, including Princeton97 and Harvard Law School.98 
These schools have since reached settlements with OCR in which 
they agreed to change the way they handle sexual assault so as to 
meet the protocol set forth in the DCL.99 
On May 1, 2014, DOE released a list of fifty-four colleges and 
universities under investigation,100 and that number has grown—
                                                                                                             
 90 Id.  
 91 Id. at 10, 12. 
 92 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–166, 105 Stat. 1071–1100, 1073. 
 93 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 8, at 12. 
 94 Id. 
 95 As of May 1, 2014, no university had ever lost funding for violating Title 
IX. See Tyler Kingkade, 55 Colleges Face Sexual Assault Investigations, 
HUFFINGTON POST (last updated July 1, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2014/05/01/college-sexual-assault_n_5247267.html. 
 96 See, e.g., Princeton Violation, supra note 14; Harvard Violation, supra note 
15. 
 97 Princeton Violation, supra note 14. 
 98 Harvard Violation, supra note 15. 
 99 See Princeton Violation, supra note 14; Harvard Violation, supra note 15. 
 100 DOE List, supra note 13. 
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there are currently 310 open cases, with multiple schools facing 
more than one investigation.101 There is no finding of fact required 
to be placed on this list; it simply requires a complaint by one per-
son.102 Importantly, this release conflicts with the policies applica-
ble to other federal agencies.  For example, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is statutorily barred from releas-
ing the names of those under investigation in Title VII cases,103 and 
“[a]ny person who makes public information in violation of this sub-
section shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not 
more than one year, or both.”104 Similarly, the Department of Justice 
has an explicit policy against releasing information on current in-
vestigations except in unusual circumstances.105 
Even if universities don’t take the threat of losing federal fund-
ing seriously, such public shaming is almost certainly having an ef-
fect.106 Two recent articles have discussed how universities under 
suspicion for violating Title IX are receiving fewer applications 
from prospective students and fewer donations from alumni.107 
II. SURVEY RESEARCH 
In June 2015, the highest-ranked twenty universities, the top ten 
liberal arts colleges, and the top five historically black colleges, as 
determined by the 2014 U.S. News and World Reports higher edu-
cation rankings,108 were contacted by email and asked a series of 
                                                                                                             
 101 See Title IX: Tracking Sexual Assault Investigations, THE CHRON. OF 
HIGHER EDUC., http://projects.chronicle.com/titleix/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2017). 
 102 DOE List, supra note 13. 
 103 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(b) (2012). 
 104 Id. 
 105 Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.jus-
tice.gov/usao-ri/frequently-asked-questions-0 (last updated June 23, 2015) (“Jus-
tice Department guidelines, rules of professional conduct, and rules of court, as 
well as considerations of fairness to defendants, require that we not make com-
ments that could prejudice a defendant’s right to a fair trial.”). 
 106 See, e.g., Nelson supra note 57; Tyler Kingkade, Alumni Are Creating a 
Network to Put Pressure on Universities over Sexual Assault, HUFFINGTON POST 
(May 29, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/28/alumni-network-sex
ual-assault-college_n_5401194.html. 
 107 Nelson, supra note 57; Kingkade, supra note 106. 
 108 The author referred to the list compiled by the 2014 U.S. News and World 
Reports. National University Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., (Sept. 10, 
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questions about the procedural protections afforded to students al-
leged to have committed sexual assault. All were asked about pro-
tections considered fundamental to those accused of a crime by the 
state: the standard of proof, the right to an adjudicatory hearing, the 
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, the right to counsel, 
the right to silence, and the right to appeal. Other than the right to 
appeal, all are part of the Bill of Rights, which through the incorpo-
ration clause of the Fourteenth Amendment have been deemed to 
apply to the states.109 
Although a few schools responded to the initial inquiry, many 
did so only after further additional emails and phone calls. Some 
administrators were extremely reluctant to share information. 
Online policies were used to fill in the gaps as much as possible, and 
follow-up email and/or phone calls were attempted to confirm re-
sults. During the course of writing this Article, this Author became 
aware that one university had changed from the traditional adjudi-
catory method to the investigatory model. The results were changed 
accordingly, but the reader should be aware that other schools may 
have also changed their method of adjudication since the gathering 
of data for this Article. 
 




versities/spp+25]; National Liberal Arts College Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP., (Sept. 10, 2013) http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-col-
leges/rankings/national-liberal-arts-colleges/spp+25 [https://web.archive.org/we
b/20140401054309/http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-college
s/rankings/national-liberal-arts-colleges/spp+25]; Historically Black College and 




 109 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. (The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution prohibits states from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law.”). In determining what that means, the Supreme 
Court turned to the first eight Amendments of the Constitution, otherwise known 
as the Bill of Rights. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X. Over time, in piecemeal fashion, 
the Court held that almost all of these rights were protected against state action 
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
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A. Findings 
The tables below show the findings of this investigation. 
 
Table 1: Standard of Proof  
 
 
Standard of proof 
94% 
Preponderance 









    
Different standard 












As Table 1 shows, thirty-four of the institutions of higher edu-
cation (94%) set the standard of proof at preponderance of the evi-
dence, one used beyond a reasonable doubt, and one was unknown. 
Eight IHEs (22%) set a different standard of proof for non-sex alle-
gations; all but one made that standard more onerous. Twenty-three 
IHEs (64%) used the same standard, and five (14%) were unknown. 
 














All schools used either an adjudicatory or an investigatory 
model for determining whether a violation occurred. The twenty 
schools (56%) that used the adjudicatory model conducted an initial 
investigation, but the determination of whether a violation occurred 
could only be made at an adjudicatory hearing. An adjudicatory 
hearing is similar to a trial in the sense that evidence is presented in 
one hearing in front of a fact finder with the accused present. Wit-
nesses testify at the hearing, although schools usually allow hearsay 
evidence, which means that the fact finder may consider a witness 
interview conducted by the Title IX investigator. 
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Sixteen schools (44%) used an investigatory model. The inves-
tigatory model is one in which a single investigator (or sometimes 
two) prepares a report after having met with the parties and any wit-
nesses. The accused student does not have the right to be present for 
these interviews. Sometimes that same investigator determines 
whether a violation occurred, and sometimes the report is turned 
over to a third party (or parties) who determine(s) whether a viola-
tion occurred based on the contents of the investigation report. That 
person may request additional information, but there will never be a 
live hearing in which all of the evidence is presented in one place, 
with the accused present. 
 
Table 3: Schools that Provide Right to Adjudicatory        
Hearing 
 
Adjudicatory Model Detail (% of 20 schools)
 
Right to an 
Adjudicatory  
Hearing 
70% - Yes (14) 0% 
Unknown 
(0) 
25% - Yes, Limited: 
school decides (5) 
5% - Yes, Limited: evidence (1) 











40% - 3 or more faculty / staff /  
admin (8) 
25% - 3 or more faculty / staff / 
student (5) 
5% - 3 or more unspecified (1) 





60% - Yes (12) 
 




   
 
Panel vote 
60% - majority (12) 15% 
Unknown 
(3) 
10% - 1 decider (2) 
15% - 3 or more 
deciders unanimous (3) 
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For the twenty schools that used the adjudicatory model, four-
teen (70%) gave the accused the absolute right to an adjudicatory 
hearing. That meant that if he requested a hearing to resolve guilt, 
he would get one. Five schools (25%) allowed for an adjudicatory 
hearing, but only if the school decided it was the appropriate way to 
determine guilt. For instance, at one school, the investigator pre-
pared a report, to which the parties had a chance to review and re-
spond. A separate panel then reviewed the report and made a deter-
mination of responsibility. If that panel unanimously agreed that a 
hearing was not necessary, then it would make its decision based 
only on the investigation report. If it decided a hearing was neces-
sary, then there would be a closed hearing where both parties and 
witnesses were allowed to testify. One school (5%) allowed for an 
adjudicatory hearing but significantly limited the evidence that 
could be admitted. For instance, it might allow the parties to testify 
but prohibit any witness testimony, even if it was relevant to the 
determination of responsibility. Instead, the fact finder would rely 
on the witness statements included in the investigation report. 
For those schools that used an adjudicatory model, two (10%) 
allowed a single person to determine responsibility. Eight schools 
(40%) had a panel of three or more faculty, staff, or administrators. 
Five (25%) had a panel of three or more, but it included students. 
One (5%) had a panel of three or more to determine responsibility, 
but the composition of that panel was unspecified. The composition 
of the panel for four schools (20%) was unknown. 
Twelve schools (60%) used a majority vote to determine guilt. 
The minimum size of the adjudicatory hearing using a majority vote 
was three. Two schools (10%) had one person make the decision, 
and three schools (15%) required that the decision be unanimous. 
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Table 4: Schools that Use Investigatory Model110 
 





38% - Single Model: Investigator 






13% - Split Model: Investigator 
Reports & Separate Single  
Individual Decides (2) 
44% - Split Model: Investigator 
Reports & 2 or More  
Individuals Decide (7) 
 
All of the schools that used the investigatory model had an in-
vestigator prepare a report as to what occurred, but they differed in 
who determined responsibility. Six schools (38%) used the single 
investigator model. That meant that the person who investigated the 
case was also responsible for determining whether a violation had 
occurred. Two schools (12.5=13%) used a split model in which one 
person investigated and a separate person determined whether a vi-
olation had occurred. Seven schools (43.75=44%) had two or more 
people (all separate from the investigator) determine whether a vio-
lation had occurred. 
 
Table 5: Right to Confront and Cross Examine111  
 
 Yes - 6% (2) 
Right to Limited through investigator - 8% (3) 
Confront Limited through panel - 50% (18) 
 No - 30.6=31% (11) 
 Unknown - 6% (2) 
 
Only two of the schools (6%) provided the right to directly ques-
tion the accuser. Three (8%) allowed the accused to submit ques-
tions to the investigator who would decide whether or not to ask 
those questions. Of course, the accused would not be present to hear 
the questions or the responses, and so this approach denies the         
                                                                                                             
 110 The numbers are rounded so they do not add up to 100%. 
 111 The numbers are rounded so they do not add up to 100%. 
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accused the right to confront and cross-examine. Eighteen schools 
(50%) allowed the student to submit questions to the hearing panel, 
which would determine whether to ask them. Eleven schools 
(30.6%=31%) did not allow the accused to ask questions of his        
accuser in any capacity. For two schools (6%), the results were un-
known. 
 





































Yes, but adverse 



















As Table 6 shows, the vast majority of universities (91%) gave 
accused students the right to counsel, but it was almost always an 
abridged right. In thirty-one schools (85%), attorneys could be pre-
sent, but only in the capacity of an advisor. They were not allowed 
to address the investigator or the panel in any way. One school (3%) 
allowed attorneys to participate, but in a limited fashion. Two 
schools (6%) did not allow for any right to counsel. Only one school 
(3%) gave students a more robust right to counsel. That meant the 
attorney would be allowed to participate fully in the hearing by ques-
tioning witnesses and addressing the panel directly. For one school 
(3%), the results were unknown. 
                                                                                                             
 112 The numbers are rounded so they do not add up to 100%. 
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All but one of the known universities (55.6%=56%) gave the re-
spondent the right to remain silent. One school (3%) did not give 
students the right to remain silent, and for fifteen schools (42%) the 
results were unknown. 
Finally, all schools promised the right to appeal. Most schools 
limited the appeal to procedural grounds, and this Author is aware 
of only one school that allowed an appeal of the factual findings. 
B. Comparison with Other Studies 
University protections for students charged with misconduct 
have received surprisingly little attention with only two empirical 
studies over the past thirty years. In 1999, Carl and Vivian Berger 
studied the protections that state and private universities provided to 
students charged with academic misconduct.113 They sent letters to 
222 public and private universities selected at random and received 
responses from 159.114 Berger and Berger found that 90% provided 
for a hearing before an impartial body (as compared with twenty, or 
56% here); 90% allowed the accused to remain silent without an ad-
verse finding of guilt (as compared with twenty, or 56% here); and 
over 90% gave students the right to confront and cross-examine ad-
verse witnesses (as compared with two, or 6% that gave the right, 
and twenty-one, or 58% that gave a limited right here).115 One area 
in which IHEs have improved is the right to counsel. Berger and 
Berger found that only 58% of the state schools surveyed allowed 
the advisor to be an attorney (as compared with 91% that allowed 
lawyers in at least some situations).116 As with present procedures, 
those schools that did provide the right to counsel often prohibited 
direct participation.117 
In 2002, Heather M. Karjane, Bonnie S. Fisher, and Francis T. 
Cullen studied how IHEs adjudicate sexual assault.118 They used a 
multi-faceted approach including a content analysis of published 
                                                                                                             
 113 See generally Berger & Berger, supra note 34. 
 114 Id. at 296. 
 115 Id. at 297–98. 
 116 Id. at 298. 
 117 Id. 
 118 See generally KARJANE, ET AL., supra note 35. 
2017] ADJUDICATING SEXUAL ASSAULT 399 
 
sexual assault policy materials, email surveys of campus adminis-
trators, and field research at eight colleges and universities.119 Their 
sample was comprised of 2,438 schools, and they received an over-
all response rate of 41%.120 
Karjane et al. found that only 22.4% of schools specified the 
burden of proof used in sexual assault cases (as compared with 
thirty-five, or 97% here), and of those, 81.4% used preponderance 
of the evidence (as compared with thirty-four, or 94% here); 3.3% 
used beyond a reasonable doubt as compared with one, or 3% 
here.121 They found that of the 203 public four-year universities that 
mentioned who decided if a student had violated the code of con-
duct, 82.3% had judicial or disciplinary members make that decision 
as opposed to one individual (as compared with twenty-one, or 58% 
now).122 Of those universities that described their proceedings, 
68.5% mentioned cross-examination (as compared with twenty-
three, or 63.8=64% now),123 but it was unclear whether that included 
direct questioning of the complainant and/or whether the complain-
ant had to actually respond.124 Furthermore, of the seventy-four 
four-year public universities that mentioned the type of vote needed 
for a finding of responsibility, 94.6% used majority; 1.4% were 
unanimous, and the remaining 4.1% used something else.125 The 
present study found that twelve, or 33%, of all schools used a ma-
jority vote to determine responsibility; three, or 8%, required con-
sensus or unanimity, and ten, or 28%, had one person make the de-
termination. Seven schools, 19%, used the investigatory model and 
had two or more individuals determine responsibility, but it was un-
known what their vote had to be. Four schools or 11% (one investi-
gatory and three adjudicatory) were completely unknown. 
The above comparison shows a mixed picture of how rights af-
forded to accused students have changed over time. For example, 
                                                                                                             
 119 Id. at vi. 
 120 Id. at vi–vii. 
 121 Id. at 122, table 6.12. 
 122 Id. at 121, table 6.11. 
 123 Id. at 118, table 6.9. Note that this article is classifying all schools with the 
investigatory model as not allowing cross-examination. Suggesting questions to 
an investigator who will decide whether to ask, and even if he does it will be 
outside of the accused’s presence, does not qualify as cross-examination. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at 122, table 6.12. 
400 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:377 
 
some protections have been reduced because, in the past, more 
schools afforded students the right to a hearing. The right to counsel, 
in contrast, has clearly improved. Although students may not          
currently have a robust right to an attorney, at least most schools 
give students the right to have an attorney present as an advisor. Un-
fortunately, insufficient information exists to meaningfully analyze 
either the right to confront/cross-examine or the standard of proof 
over time. Karjane et al. found that 68.5% mentioned cross-exami-
nation, but they do not specify whether that means students at those 
institutions had the right to ask questions and whether the complain-
ant had to respond.126 If that is what their findings mean, then the 
right has been significantly reduced. If they meant that students were 
allowed to indirectly question the complainant who need not re-
spond, then more schools now afford a limited right to cross-exam-
ine.127 In addition, this study found that more of the IHEs used a 
lower standard of proof (preponderance). 
III. CHALLENGING THESE PROCEEDINGS 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
forbids the deprivation of “life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law.”128  The Court has limited the reach of the Fourteenth 
Amendment—and the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the federal 
government129—through the “state action doctrine,”130 holding that 
                                                                                                             
 126 See KARJANE, ET AL., supra note 35, at 118, table 6.9. 
 127 See id. 
 128 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 129 In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 
483 U.S. 522 (U.S. 1987), the SFAA argued that the USOC’s enforcement of its 
exclusive right to use the word “Olympic” was discriminatory in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment. Id. at 542. In analyzing this question, the Court wrote: “The 
fundamental inquiry is whether the USOC is a governmental actor to whom the 
prohibitions of the Constitution apply.” Id. The Court then applied the public 
function test and the state compulsion test and concluded that the actions of the 
USOC did not constitute state or governmental action by Congress. Id. at 542–
547. 
 130 Although the Civil Rights cases are often recognized as the “earliest state 
action decision,” the Court discussed the doctrine in earlier cases. See GEOFFREY 
R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1584 (5th ed. 2005); see also United 
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554–55 (1875) (“The fourteenth amendment 
prohibits a State from denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
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“the prohibitions of the amendment are against State laws and acts 
done under State authority.”131 In other words, if the conduct in 
question is private, “the Amendment affords no shield, no matter 
how unfair that conduct may be.”132 Importantly, the state action 
doctrine also applies to the federal government, and “doctrine de-
veloped in the context of suits involving conduct by state and mu-
nicipal bodies and officials is directly relevant.”133 
Public universities are, of course, state actors; but private uni-
versities would seem not to be. Nevertheless, otherwise private con-
duct may fall within the ambit of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amend-
ment if it qualifies as “state action.”134 Any university conduct that 
amounts to state action is subject to the Fourteenth Amendment135 
and renders the university liable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.136 
Professor Charles Black called “the ‘state action’ problem . . . 
the most important problem in American law.”137 Students hoping 
to challenge the disciplinary proceedings of their private university 
                                                                                                             
tection of the laws; but this provision does not, any more than the one which pre-
cedes it, and which we have just considered, add anything to the rights which one 
citizen has under the Constitution against another.”); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 
313, 318 (1879) (“The provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . have refer-
ence to State action exclusively, and not to any action of private individuals.”). 
 131 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (“It is State action of a particular 
character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the sub-
ject matter of the amendment.”). 
 132 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988); 
see also Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349–50 (1974). 
 133 Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 591 n.33 (1983) (“The phrase ‘state 
action’ is used here in its generic sense, to refer to action by any level of govern-
ment, from local to national . . . At issue in the present case is action by officials 
of the federal government, but doctrine developed in the context of suits involving 
conduct by state and municipal bodies and officials is directly relevant.”). 
 134 See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1012 (1982). 
 135 See id. 
 136 “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action 
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(2012). 
 137 Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection, and 
California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 69 (1967). 
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would undoubtedly agree. For the state action question is a “thresh-
old” one; unless state action is present, the Court will not even reach 
the constitutionality of the challenged act or policy.138 There is good 
reason to believe that if state action could be shown, plaintiffs might 
well prevail on the merits.139 In a companion article, this Author ar-
gues that students facing expulsion from state universities for sexual 
assault are entitled to procedural due process due to the considerable 
liberty and property interests at stake.140 That article then employs 
the balancing test from Matthews v. Eldridge to evaluate whether 
the proceedings (similar to those used here) comport with due pro-
cess and concludes they do not.141 Consequently, the state action 
question has great practical significance. 
A. Is There State Action? 
State action doctrine is notoriously difficult.142 Even the Su-
preme Court has acknowledged as much, writing, “[t]his Court has 
never attempted the ‘impossible task’ of formulating an infallible 
test for determining whether the State ‘in any of its manifestations’ 
has become significantly involved in private discriminations.”143 
The Court explained that “[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing cir-
cumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private 
conduct be attributed its true significance.”144 It should come as no 
surprise then that critics have called the state action doctrine inco-
herent,145 a “conceptual disaster area,”146 and a “‘doctrine’ without 
                                                                                                             
 138 Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Emerging Threshold Approach to State Action 
Determinations: Trying to Make Sense of Flagg Brothers, Inc. v Brooks, 69 GEO. 
L.J. 745, 747 (1981). 
 139 See id. at 746. 
 140 See Lave, supra note 37, at 669. 
 141 See id. at 696. 
 142 See State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 HARV. L. REV. 
1248, 1255 (2010); see also Julie K. Brown, Less is More: Decluttering the State 
Action Doctrine, 73 MO. L. REV. 561, 561–62 (2008); Martin A. Schwartz & Er-
win Chemerinsky, Dialogue on State Action, 16 TOURO L. REV. 775, 775–76 
(2000). 
 143 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967) (citation omitted). 
 144 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). 
 145 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 503, 
548–49 (1985). 
 146 Henry J. Friendly, The Public-Private Penumbra—Fourteen Years Later, 
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289, 1290 (1982). 
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shape or line . . . [that] has the flavor of a torchless search for a way 
out of a damp echoing cave.”147 Part of the problem with distin-
guishing between private and state action is that “the state always 
acts—at least in the sense that its courts resolve the resulting dispute 
according to a state policy.”148 As Professors Tushnet and Peller 
write, “[e]very exercise of ‘private’ rights in a liberal legal order 
depends on the potential exercise of state power to prevent other 
private actors from interfering with the rights holder.”149 
The confounding nature of the state action doctrine makes it all 
the more important to carefully define what is at issue here. The ac-
tion in question is not the university’s determination of responsibil-
ity in a particular case. Rather, it is the university’s decision to lower 
procedural protections in sexual assault cases.150 If that action could 
be shown to constitute “state action,” a properly pled § 1983 claim 
(including matters such as standing) might be brought against the 
university on the ground that it had violated procedural due process 
rights under the Constitution.151 
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., the Court explained that 
it would be appropriate to attribute the actions of a private party to 
that of the state only when “there is a sufficiently close nexus be-
tween the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so 
that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State 
itself.”152 The question of what factors might justify a conclusion 
that a university’s decision to lower procedural protections should 
be treated as state action is complex. The fact that universities de-
pend heavily on federal funding—funding provided on conditions—
is relevant, but is not in itself sufficient to result in a finding of state 
action.153 The Court has held that government regulation on its own, 
                                                                                                             
 147 Black, supra note 137, at 95. 
 148 Rowe, supra note 138, at 746 (emphasis added). 
 149 Gary Peller & Mark Tushnet, State Action and a New Birth of Freedom, 92 
GEO. L.J. 779, 789 (2004); but see Lillian BeVier & John Harrison, The State 
Action Principle and Its Critics, 96 VA. L. REV. 1767, 1792 (2010) (“The [state 
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 150 See Lave, supra note 37, at 657–58. 
 151 See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 145, at 550–51. 
 152 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1975). 
 153 See generally id. at 352. 
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even “‘extensive and detailed’” state regulation, is not enough to 
constitute state action.154 Furthermore, in a series of cases, the Court 
has held that a monetary relationship is inadequate on its own to 
establish the necessary connection. For instance, in Blum v. 
Yaretsky, the Court held that dependence of nursing homes on gov-
ernment funding did not transform the actions of doctors and nursing 
home administrators into the actions of the state.155 That same year 
in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, the Court declined to find state action 
even though the school in question received 90% of its funding, and 
in one year 99%, from public funds.156 
How, then, might a nexus be shown sufficient to qualify a uni-
versity’s decision to lower procedural protections as state action? 
Before proceeding, it is important to acknowledge that this Article 
makes no claim of providing a comprehensive account of the state 
action doctrine. The goal is only to give a preliminary account of 
how state action might be shown. With that caveat in mind, of the 
various tests used to determine state action, two seem most plausi-
ble.157 One is the public function exception to the state action doc-
trine, which reflects the sense among critics of the DCL that univer-
sities’ adjudication of sexual assault claims fulfills a function, or has 
some effects, similar in important respects to prosecution of criminal 
charges.158 The other is state compulsion, reflecting the charge that 
the decision to adopt lower procedural safeguards reflects the over-
whelming pressure imposed by the threat of a funding cut-off by 
DOE.159 
                                                                                                             
 154 See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841 (1982) (citations omitted). 
 155 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1005 (1982). 
 156 Rendall-Baker, 457 U.S. at 832. 
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1. PUBLIC FUNCTION 
Under the public function exception to the state action doctrine, 
a private party must comply with the Constitution if it is performing 
a task that has “traditionally [been] exclusively reserved to the 
State.”160 Although the Court has held that the management of pri-
vate property can meet the public function exception,161 it has never 
held that the actions of a private school constitute state action under 
this exception.162 
In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, the Petitioner sued for damages under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.163 The Petitioner contended that her rights under 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments were violated when she was 
dismissed without a hearing from the private school where she was 
employed after she supported a student proposal that had been de-
nied by the director of the school.164 The Court agreed with the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit that the Petitioner was not en-
titled to pursue this claim against the respondents because they had 
not acted under the color of state law when they fired her.165 The 
Court held that it was not enough for the private party to be serving 
a public function (here providing an education), but that this func-
tion must be one that has “‘traditionally [been] the exclusive prerog-
ative of the State.’”166 The Court wrote that even though it was clear 
from Chapter 766 of the Massachusetts Acts of 1972 that the state 
intended to educate maladjusted high school students, this “legisla-
tive policy choice in no way makes these services the exclusive 
province of the State.”167 As proof of this, the Court pointed out that 
“until recently[,] the State had not undertaken to provide education 
for students who could not be served by traditional public 
schools.”168 
                                                                                                             
 160 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974). 
 161 See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966); Marsh v. Ala., 326 U.S. 
501, 506 (1946). 
 162 See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191–
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Six years later, in Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 
Jerry Tarkanian, the basketball coach at the University of Nevada, 
Las Vegas, sued the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(“NCAA”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.169 He argued that his due pro-
cess rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated when he 
was not afforded a fair hearing before being suspended.170 The Court 
held that Tarkanian was not entitled to damages under § 1983 be-
cause the NCAA was not a state actor and thus was not required to 
comply with the Fourteenth Amendment.171 Although the Court 
acknowledged that regulating college athletics was a critical func-
tion, it held that it was not the exclusive (or even the traditional) 
function of the state.172 
Just as with college athletics, disciplinary proceedings are not 
the exclusive (or even the traditional) function of the state.173 To the 
contrary, universities are entitled to decide what constitutes a viola-
tion of their code of conduct, regardless of whether it would be a 
crime in state or federal court.174 In addition, at least regarding non-
sex offenses, they have significant leeway in determining how they 
determine whether a violation occurred.175 They certainly do not 
need to afford all the same protections that would be required in 
criminal court, such as the right to a jury trial and a standard of proof 
set at beyond a reasonable doubt.176 Thus, it is clear that under the 
public function test, the involvement of the government in college 
disciplinary proceedings does not constitute state action. 
2. STATE COMPULSION 
Under the state compulsion exception to the state action doc-
trine, a private party must comply with the Constitution if the state 
has exercised such coercive power over the conduct at issue that the 
“choice must in law be deemed to be that of the state.”177 
                                                                                                             
 169 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 180–81 (1988). 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. at 181–82. 
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In Blum v. Yaretsky, Respondents Yaretsky and Cuevas were 
Medicaid recipients who argued that their procedural due process 
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated when 
they were transferred from a nursing home to a lower level of care 
without notice or a hearing.178 The Court held that there was no state 
action because the decision had been made by a private organization 
(specifically the doctors and administrators at the nursing home), 
and the state was only responding to that decision.179 Justice 
Rehnquist authored the majority opinion, which set forth the test for 
state compulsion: “[A] State normally can be held responsible for a 
private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has 
provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that 
the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State.”180 
Later, in Logan v. Bennington College, the Second Circuit held 
that there was no state action when Logan was dismissed from his 
job as a drama professor pursuant to a sexual harassment policy that 
was written by the Vermont Human Rights Commission.181 The 
court noted that Bennington College had enacted the policy in an 
unrelated case, and although the state helped craft the policy, it was 
Bennington’s sole decision to find Logan responsible and then dis-
miss him.182 
The state compulsion exception, as applied to the Dear Col-
league Letter, was recently litigated in Doe v. Washington & Lee 
Univ.183 Doe had argued that Washington & Lee’s disciplinary pro-
ceedings constituted state action because the 2011 Dear Colleague 
Letter led directly to the university’s decision to discipline him.184 
Although the court found that it was “plausible that W & L was un-
der pressure to convict students accused of sexual assault in order to 
demonstrate that the school was in compliance,” that alone was not 
enough to constitute state action.185 Instead, the court held that Doe 
would have to show that “the government deprived W & L of its 
                                                                                                             
 178 Id. at 993. 
 179 Id. at 1005–12. 
 180 Id. at 1004–05. 
 181 Logan v. Bennington Coll. Corp., 72 F.3d 1017, 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 182 Id. at 1027–28. 
 183 See generally Doe v. Wash. & Lee Univ., No. 6:14–CV–00052, 2015 WL 
4647996 (W.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2015). 
 184 Id. at *9. 
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autonomy to investigate and adjudicate charges [or] . . . that the gov-
ernment participated in the decision-making process at any stage of 
the proceedings.”186 The court found that the state had not “drafted 
the disciplinary code, nor participated in determining what sentence 
was to be handed out under it.”187 Because the state wasn’t more 
directly involved, the court held that there was no state action.188 
Washington & Lee can be distinguished from the claim dis-
cussed in this Article. The plaintiff in Washington & Lee alleged that 
the outcome of his particular case represented state action.189 This 
paper, in contrast, contends that a university’s decision to lower pro-
cedural protections for all students charged with sexual assault is 
state action. Thus, this Article is focused on the proceedings in gen-
eral instead of the outcome of a particular case. 
Although both Logan and Doe failed to show that there was state 
action, a student might have more success by citing two cases de-
cided over forty years ago.190 In Powe v. Miles, the Second Circuit 
held that state regulation of educational standards at Alfred Univer-
sity was not enough to transform Alfred’s acts in curtailing protest 
and disciplining students into those of the state.191  Judge Friendly 
authored the opinion and wrote that “the state must be involved not 
simply with some activity of the institution alleged to have inflicted 
injury upon a plaintiff but with the activity that caused the injury.”192 
Although the actions of Alfred University did not constitute state 
action, Judge Friendly explained what would have: “State action 
would be . . . present here with respect to all the students if New 
York had undertaken to set policy for the control of demonstrations 
in all private universities . . . .”193 
In Coleman v. Wagner College, students sought to apply dicta 
from Judge Friendly’s opinion in asserting that their expulsion for 
demonstrating against the Vietnam War constituted state action.194 
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 187 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
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They contended that by enacting § 6450, the New York legislature 
undertook to create policy for handling campus demonstrations and, 
in so doing, became involved in the regulation of the activity that 
caused the students to be unjustly injured.195 Although the Second 
Circuit found that § 6450 “was devoid of meaningful content” in 
terms of providing specific guidance on how universities should 
handle campus demonstrations, the court still found that it could 
constitute state action:196 
We are, however, cognizant of the possibility that the 
statute may have been intended, or may be applied, 
to mean more than it purports to say. More specifi-
cally, section 6450 may be intended or applied as a 
command to the colleges of the state to adopt a new, 
more severe attitude toward campus disruption and 
to impose harsh sanctions on unruly students. The 
Governor’s Memorandum approving section 6450 
referred to an ‘intolerable situation on the Cornell 
University Campus’ and spoke of ‘the urgent need 
for adequate plans for student-university relations.’ 
Several other bills pending in the New York legisla-
ture while section 6450 was under consideration sug-
gest that the statute was enacted in an atmosphere of 
hostility toward unruly student demonstrators and of 
resolve to make disruption costly for the participants. 
If these considerations have merit and section 6450 
was intended to coerce colleges to adopt disciplinary 
codes embodying a ‘hard-line’ attitude toward stu-
dent protesters, it would appear that New York has 
indeed ‘undertaken to set policy for the control of 
demonstrations in all private universities’ and should 
be held responsible for the implementation of this 
policy.197 
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The Second Circuit then remanded the case for a determination 
of whether there was state action.198 In so doing, it alerted the Dis-
trict Court to some factors it deemed “of particular importance.”199  
“Most significant” were the actions of the state officials:200 
If these officials were to regard their function as 
more than a ministerial task, and, as an illustration, 
believed themselves empowered to prevent regula-
tions from being filed because of substantive ‘inade-
quacies,’ or exercised any other influence upon the 
content of regulations filed pursuant to Section 6450, 
they would provide strong indicia of state action.201 
The Second Circuit also directed the District Court to look into 
the attitude of the campus administrators that drafted regulations 
pursuant to § 6450.202 Although the court said it would “ordinarily 
be loath” to find that state action could arise from the mistaken be-
liefs of a private individual, “[a] reasonable and widespread belief 
among college administrators . . . that section 6450 required them to 
adopt a particular stance toward campus demonstrators would seem 
to justify a conclusion that the state intended for them to pursue that 
course of action. And this intent, if present, would provide a basis 
for a finding of state action.203 The Second Circuit then suggested 
one way of discerning the attitude of college administrators towards 
§ 6450: 
The universal adoption of noticeably more stringent 
standards governing student disruption following the 
statute’s enactment or an attempt by administrators 
to attribute the imposition of harsh penalties to the 
command of the state would give support to the con-
tention that the statute constitutes significant state in-
tervention in the area of campus discipline.204 
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Applying the reasoning from Powe and Coleman, students have 
a strong case that disciplinary proceedings implemented in response 
to the Dear Colleague Letter constitute state action. The Department 
of Education told universities that they had to make certain enumer-
ated changes to their disciplinary proceedings, including lowering 
the standard of proof to preponderance of the evidence, or risk losing 
federal funding.205 Since then, the DOE has actively policed univer-
sities to make sure they are doing what they are supposed to, pub-
lished a list of schools under investigation, and found that at least 
two schools were in violation.206 In addition, after the DCL, there is 
evidence that there was a universal adoption of more stringent stand-
ards—with schools lowering their standards of proof and changing 
their disciplinary processes in ways that make it easier to find some-
one responsible of sexual assault.207 To make this case fully, a stu-
dent would have to do an empirical study akin to this one, but that 
was focused more on whether universities made changes to their 
policies in response to the DCL. 
Although Powe and Coleman are still good law, a court might 
be unwilling to follow Judge Friendly’s more expansive notion of 
state action on the ground that it has been foreclosed by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Blum v. Yaretsky.208 Even so, there is still a way 
that a student could succeed. As Doe v. Washington & Lee indicates, 
the Court’s decision in Blum would make it difficult for a student to 
challenge a particular finding of fault, but a student might be more 
successful if he challenged the university disciplinary proceedings 
at a more general level.209  
The argument would look like this: OCR has exercised the kind 
of coercive power over university disciplinary proceedings to turn 
the private actions of private colleges and universities into those of 
the state. As detailed above, OCR specifically told schools to change 
their policies, and threatened schools with termination of federal 
                                                                                                             
 205 See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 8. 
 206 See id.; DOE List, supra note 13; Princeton Violation, supra note 14; Har-
vard Violation, supra note 15. 
 207 See generally FIRE’S GUIDE, supra note 158. 
 208 See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004–05 (1982). 
 209 See Doe v. Wash. & Lee Univ., No. 6:14–CV–00052, 2015 WL 4647996, 
at *9 (W.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2015). 
412 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:377 
 
funds if they did not comply.210 OCR further tightened the screws 
by publishing a list of schools under investigation even though there 
was no finding of fact required to make the list.211  The DOE did this 
even though such a list would violate Title VII and DOJ policy.212 
This Article contends that the combination of threatening to with-
draw federal funds unless universities took specific actions and then 
publishing a list of those under investigation for not having done so 
was sufficiently coercive to constitute state action. 
3. STANDING 
A court would not hear the constitutional claim unless the plain-
tiff had standing.213 Like state action doctrine, the law of standing is 
complex and not always predictable, but the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized three constitutional standing requirements.214  First, the 
plaintiff must allege a personal injury—one that is imminent and 
actual, rather than hypothetical or speculative.215 The injury must 
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also be “fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful con-
duct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”216 
The Supreme Court has long made clear that “injury” under the 
standing doctrine is defined capaciously.217 The term is “not con-
fined to those who [can] show ‘economic harm[.]’”218 The Court has 
recognized harm to “aesthetic and recreational values”219 as well as 
“‘conservational’” values220 and “First Amendment values.”221 The 
Court has also held that a person has suffered an injury-in-fact when 
he has been “prevented from . . . competing on an equal footing”222 
or if he is a member of a disfavored group that is “stigmatiz[ed] . . . 
as ‘innately inferior.’”223 Finally, in 2016 the Court explicitly rec-
ognized that an “intangible injury” could establish standing as long 
as it is also “concrete.”224 
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In a case against a university, the asserted violation—a matter of 
the merits—would be the university’s lowered procedural protec-
tions below the minimum required by the Constitution. The capa-
ciousness of “injury” under the standing doctrine means that a stu-
dent might claim to be injured by this violation in either or both of 
two ways. The first is the most obvious. A student could claim that 
he has suffered practical and stigmatic injuries from the imposition 
of a penalty such as suspension or expulsion (or the imminent pos-
sibility of such a penalty if a hearing was scheduled or under way). 
The second is subtler. A student could claim that he has suffered the 
inhibiting effect—whether on forming relationships or expressing 
views—from the prospect of being subjected to a hearing with pro-
cedural protections that fall below the constitutional minimum. 
Although the first type of injury seems preferable because it is 
more concrete, it might be in tension with the underlying claim on 
the merits. That is, framing the claim as a challenge to the univer-
sity’s decision to lower the procedural protections in all sexual as-
sault cases—as opposed to the university’s decision regarding guilt 
in a particular case—while helpful in dealing with state action is-
sues, might create difficulties for the second and third components 
of standing where the alleged injury is expulsion or suspension. A 
court that vigorously applied the “causation” component of the 
standing doctrine might conclude that the simple act of lowering the 
procedural protections did not necessarily cause the expulsion or 
suspension. Would a plaintiff have to demonstrate that with stronger 
procedural protections he would not have been found liable? That 
might be very difficult to prove. But some of the Court’s standing 
cases might suggest such a requirement.225 In other cases involving 
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challenges to universities’ use of affirmative action, however, the 
Court has not applied such a demanding test.226 These later cases 
suggest that a plaintiff might establish causation by framing the in-
jury not as the outcome—i.e., expulsion or suspension—but as be-
ing subjected to unlawful procedures. The injury, in other words, 
would be the use of procedures that violate due process to determine 
whether the plaintiff would be permitted to continue his education. 
Thus framed, the injury would be directly caused by the constitu-
tional violation being alleged and would be fully redressed by a rul-
ing that the procedures were unconstitutional. 
As for the second type of injury, a student who has not been 
sanctioned might nevertheless still have a claim. He might, for ex-
ample, allege that although his university allows him to engage in 
consensual romantic and sexual relationships,227 he is so afraid of 
being unable to fully and fairly defend himself should he be wrong-
fully accused of sexual assault that he is avoiding romantic relation-
ships.228 Making matters worse, the standards of affirmative defense 
and coercion are so vague that he isn’t even sure what constitutes 
sexual assault. As a result, he is avoiding sex altogether. Since a 
2013 Facebook study found that 28% of people married someone 
they met in college,229 the student worries that the disciplinary pro-
ceeding is undermining his best chance of finding a spouse. 
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 226 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 260–69 (2003); see also Regents of 
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 228 To be clear, this Article is not arguing that the chilling effect of a private 
university’s disciplinary proceedings is the same as the state outlawing certain 
kinds of intimate conduct. 
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The student could also allege that the unfair proceedings have 
made him reluctant to have even platonic friendships, which is rele-
vant for students matriculating at schools where sex and dating are 
forbidden.230 His ability to learn and to succeed academically has 
also been impaired because he refuses to do group projects with only 
one other student unless witnesses are present. Indeed, his fear of 
biased and unfair proceedings has made him reluctant to do labora-
tory work where he would be working in a confined space with an-
other student, and he worries that not doing so will derail his lifelong 
dream of becoming a doctor. Overall, the student’s fear of being 
falsely accused and unable to adequately defend himself has caused 
deep unhappiness and undermined his sense of community and con-
nection to his classmates. It has also negatively impacted his educa-
tion and future success. 
An injury to the plaintiff’s ability to form relationships, whether 
romantic or platonic, would seem to comport with the Court’s gen-
erally expansive conception of injuries. If “[a]esthetic and environ-
mental well-being, like economic well-being, are important ingredi-
ents of the quality of life in our society,”231 certainly the same is true 
of emotional and intellectual well-being. In Lawrence v. Texas, the 
Court discussed the significance of sexual intimacy, calling it the 
“most private human conduct”232 and saying that it “involv[es] the 
most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, 
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, [which] are cen-
tral to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”233 More 
recently, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court explicitly recognized 
the value of “expression, intimacy, and spirituality” in holding that 
same sex couples had the right to marry.234 
The Court has also “long recognized that, given the important 
purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech 
and thought associated with the university environment, universities 
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 231 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972). 
 232 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). 
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occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.”235 If a disci-
plinary policy is chilling student speech, isn’t that interfering with 
the “robust exchange of ideas,” which is of “paramount importance 
in the fulfillment of [the university’s] mission”?236 Indeed, isn’t such 
a policy causing harm not just to the student who is afraid to partic-
ipate, but also to the university as a whole? 
There might be some uncertainty, however, about the success of 
claims by students whose asserted injury was inhibition of relation-
ships or expression. On the one hand, and ironically, the causation 
issues discussed above might be easier to handle in such cases than 
in cases where the student claimed an expulsion or suspension or 
some other sanction as the injury. The plaintiff would assert that 
what was inhibiting him from forming relationships was his fear of 
being subjected to a process with standards that had been lowered 
through state action in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
causation would appear quite direct. 
On the other hand, at least in Clapper, the Court seemed wary of 
injuries that it viewed as self-inflicted or manufactured for the pur-
poses of creating standing.237 There, plaintiffs alleged that the fed-
eral government was engaging in illegal surveillance of some of 
their conversations, and that as a result, the plaintiffs had been 
forced to “take costly and burdensome measures to protect the con-
fidentiality of their communications.”238 The Court responded that 
plaintiffs could not “manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm 
on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that 
is not certainly impending.”239 Clapper may not be representative of 
the broad thrust of the Court’s standing doctrine, as Justice Breyer 
suggested in his dissenting opinion,240 but it does raise the prospect 
that a court might conclude that a student who said he was refraining 
from certain activities was simply manufacturing standing. 
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If a student is able to establish standing, and if he is able to con-
vince the court that there is state action and that the school’s disci-
plinary proceedings violate procedural due process, then he would 
be able to sue for damages under § 1983.241 More importantly, he 
would also be able to request a preliminary injunction that would 
bar the university from using its current disciplinary proceedings 
until a court ruled that they adequately protected the procedural due 
process rights of accused students.242 
B. Alternative Argument if State Action Cannot Be Established 
Without the Fourteenth Amendment limiting what is permissi-
ble, it will be harder to challenge these disciplinary proceedings in 
court. Yet, students still have three major avenues of attack. The first 
two are essentially contractual; students can argue that their contrac-
tual rights with the university have been explicitly breached, and 
that the proceedings violate their implicit right to “fundamental” 243 
or “basic fairness.”244 They can also argue that their right to gender 
equality under Title IX entitles them to better procedures. Each will 
be briefly discussed below. 
1. CONTRACT 
The student/college relationship is “essentially contractual in na-
ture,”245 which means that students can sue for breach of contract if 
the university is not meeting its procedural obligations. Contract dis-
putes are governed by state as opposed to constitutional law. In de-
termining the terms of the contract, courts can look at statements 
from student manuals,246 registration materials,247 brochures, and 
                                                                                                             
 241 See generally, Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 845–51 (1982). 
 242 See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105–06 (1983). 
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other advertisements.248 To determine whether there has been a 
breach, courts must consider what is a “reasonable expectation” of 
interpretation for the contractual terms.249 In other words, courts 
must ask, “what meaning the party making the manifestation, the 
university, should reasonably expect the other party to give it.”250 
Recently, students have achieved some success challenging their 
punishment on contractual grounds. In Doe v. Brandeis University, 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts conducted 
a detailed analysis of Doe’s breach of contract claim and found that 
Doe had alleged sufficient evidence to survive a dismissal for insuf-
ficiency of the evidence.251  The grounds included that Brandeis al-
legedly failed to provide Doe with a copy of the Special Examiner’s 
Report and that it failed to maintain confidentiality of his educa-
tional record.252 Several months later, in Doe v. Brown University, 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island found that 
Brown had breached Doe’s contractual rights by using the wrong 
definition of consent.253 Although the alleged incident had taken 
place in 2014, Brown used a definition of consent from the revised 
2015–2016 Title IX policy, which included “manipulation” as a 
ground for lack of consent.254 The court held that Doe had proved 
by a preponderance of the evidence that Brown breached its contract 
with Doe by the manner in which it conducted his disciplinary hear-
ing, and thus he was entitled to a new hearing.255 
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2. BASIC FAIRNESS 
Although private schools need not comply with the Constitution, 
they do not have a free pass to trample students’ procedural rights.256 
The Supreme Court has never directly ruled on what constitutes fair-
ness in private disciplinary proceedings, but lower courts have set a 
low bar.257 If the school is complying with its own rules and proce-
dures, courts are likely to find the proceedings fair.258 Some courts 
will only intervene when the proceedings are “arbitrary and capri-
cious.”259 Other courts explicitly require the proceedings to comply 
with “fundamental” fairness.260 In other words, they don’t just look 
to see whether the university provided students with the procedural 
safeguards it specifically contracted to, but they “examine the hear-
ing to ensure that it was conducted with basic fairness.”261 Despite 
these hurdles, students have seen some success in challenging these 
procedures.262 
In Doe v. Brandeis University, Doe sued Brandeis University for 
various causes of action related to him being found guilty of sexual 
misconduct under the university’s procedures for such cases.263 
Brandeis filed a motion to dismiss, and the United States District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts was asked to consider 
whether Doe had filed sufficient information to proceed.264 The 
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court began its analysis by acknowledging that the Sixth Amend-
ment does not bind Brandeis, but even so, its “authority to discipline 
its students is not entirely without limits.”265 The court wrote that 
Brandeis had to afford its students “basic fairness” or what the court 
called, “some minimum level of fair play.”266 The court went on: 
“Put simply, a fair determination of the facts requires a fair process, 
not tilted to favor a particular outcome, and a fair and neutral fact-
finder, not predisposed to reach a particular conclusion.”267 Im-
portantly, the court noted that Brandeis had an obligation to provide 
basic fairness in its proceedings which was “separate from and in 
addition to its contractual obligation” to abide by the rules enumer-
ated in the university handbook.268 
The court then provided a detailed account of all of Brandeis’ 
procedural failings.269 It noted that Doe had not been given a “full 
account” of what he had allegedly done wrong;270 was not allowed 
to have a lawyer to assist him in either an active or a passive capac-
ity;271 was not given the right to confront his accuser, which some 
found particularly troubling because “the entire investigation . . . 
turned on the credibility of the accuser and the accused” and 
“[u]nder the circumstances, the lack of an opportunity for cross-ex-
amination may have had a very substantial effect on the fairness of 
the proceeding”;272 was not given the right to cross-examine the wit-
nesses who the Special Examiner questioned and relied on in some 
degree in her report;273 and was denied the right to an effective ap-
peal because he could not challenge the decision because it was “not 
supported by the evidence or that it was otherwise unfair, unwise, or 
simply wrong.”274 
The court also was troubled by the fact that Brandeis used a sin-
gle investigator process, similar to that of six of the schools studied 
here, in which one person investigates the case and determines 
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guilt.275 The court wrote: “The dangers of combining in a single in-
dividual the power to investigate, prosecute, and convict with little 
effective power of review are obvious. No matter how well-inten-
tioned, such a person may have preconceptions and biases, may 
make mistakes, and may reach premature conclusions.”276 
Finally, the court was concerned by the fact that Brandeis used 
a lower standard of proof in sexual assault hearings than any other 
kind of violation, which it found particularly problematic in light of 
the elimination of other basic procedural rights of the accused: 
The standard of proof in sexual misconduct cases at 
Brandeis is proof by a “preponderance of the evi-
dence.” For virtually all other forms of alleged mis-
conduct at Brandeis, the more demanding standard of 
proof by “clear and convincing evidence” is em-
ployed. The selection of a lower standard (presuma-
bly, at the insistence of the United States Department 
of Education) is not problematic, standing alone; that 
standard is commonly used in civil proceedings, 
even to decide matters of great importance. Here, 
however, the lowering of the standard appears to 
have been a deliberate choice by the university to 
make cases of sexual misconduct easier to prove—
and thus more difficult to defend, both for guilty and 
innocent students alike. It retained the higher stand-
ard for virtually all other forms of student miscon-
duct. The lower standard may thus be seen, in con-
text, as part of an effort to tilt the playing field against 
accused students, which is particularly troublesome 
in light of the elimination of other basic rights of the 
accused.277 
For all these reasons, the court held that Doe had raised suffi-
cient information to survive a motion to dismiss.278 
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3. TITLE IX 
Title IX provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on 
the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance[.]”279 Al-
though Title IX was aimed at protecting the rights of women, the 
language is gender neutral, and male students are starting to use it to 
challenge student disciplinary proceedings.280 
In Yusuf, the Second Circuit set forth a framework for determin-
ing whether a school’s disciplinary proceeding violates a student’s 
rights under Title IX.281 Yusuf distinguished between two different 
theories of liability under Title IX: “erroneous outcome” and “selec-
tive enforcement.”282 As the court in Yusuf explained, a student fil-
ing a challenge under an “erroneous outcome” theory must meet two 
requirements: 
Plaintiffs who claim that an erroneous outcome was 
reached must allege particular facts sufficient to cast 
some articulable doubt on the accuracy of the out-
come of the disciplinary proceeding . . . . A plaintiff 
must thus also allege particular circumstances sug-
gesting that gender bias was a motivating factor be-
hind the erroneous finding.283 
The selective enforcement claim, on the other hand, asserts that 
“regardless of the student’s guilt or innocence, the severity of the 
penalty and/or the decision to initiate the proceeding was affected 
by the student’s gender.”284 
Recently, courts have indicated receptivity to attacking discipli-
nary proceedings on Title IX grounds.285 In 2014, John Doe sued 
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Washington & Lee for five causes of action stemming from his ex-
pulsion for non-consensual sexual intercourse.286 Washington & Lee 
moved to dismiss, but the United States District Court for the West-
ern District of Virginia, Lynchburg Division, denied that motion in 
part, finding that Doe had pled sufficient factual allegations to sup-
port a Title IX claim.287 The court wrote: 
Plaintiff’s allegations, taken as true, suggest that W 
& L’s disciplinary procedures, at least when it comes 
to charges of sexual misconduct, amount to ‘a prac-
tice of railroading accused students’ . . . .Given these 
allegations, as well as Plaintiff’s charge that W & L 
was under pressure from the government to convict 
male students of sexual assault, a reasonable fact 
finder could plausibly determine that Plaintiff was 
wrongly found responsible for sexual misconduct 
and that this erroneous finding was motivated by 
gender bias.288 
In July 2016, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals also held that 
sufficient evidence had been presented to go forward on a gender 
bias claim.289 John Doe sued Columbia University for violating Title 
IX by practicing gender bias against him after the university inves-
tigated and suspended him for sexual assault.290 The District Court 
originally dismissed the case for making an insufficient claim, but 
the Second Circuit reversed and remanded on the ground that there 
was enough evidence to show gender bias.291  
A few months earlier, in February, a Senior United States Judge 
partially denied a motion to dismiss in Cornell.292 The court held 
that “[g]iven the totality of the circumstances . . . Plaintiff plausibly 
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establishe[d] a causal connection between gender bias and the out-
come of the disciplinary proceeding.”293 The court thus denied Cor-
nell’s motion to dismiss on Title IX grounds.294 
CONCLUSION 
As this Article has shown, the top American colleges and uni-
versities do not give students what would be considered fundamen-
tal rights in the criminal context.  Because universities are rightfully 
being pressured to take rape more seriously, it is especially im-
portant that accused students are treated fairly. Although accused 
students do not face prison time, they do face expulsion, which can 
forever derail their chance of success.295 With stakes this high, uni-
versities should have a fair procedure that, at a minimum, requires a 
robust right to counsel, an adjudicatory hearing with direct question-
ing, the right to evidence, and a standard of proof set at clear and 
convincing evidence.296 Anything less poses the risk that innocent 
men and women will be found responsible for offenses they did not 
commit. 
Challenging these laws will not be easy. In general, students at 
private schools are afforded fewer procedural protections than those 
at public universities.297 Ironically, the Department of Education’s 
heavy handedness in forcing universities to comply with the Dear 
Colleague Letter is what may enable students to successfully chal-
lenge these procedures as depriving them of procedural due pro-
cess.298 Indeed, this Article has argued that because of the coercive 
actions of the DOE, private schools have become state actors, which 
means that students there are entitled to the same constitutional 
rights as students at a public university. 
Even if state action claims fail, students have successfully chal-
lenged campus disciplinary proceedings on other grounds. They 
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have shown that universities are violating their contractual obliga-
tions, and they have argued convincingly that disciplinary proceed-
ings violate their right to “basic fairness” and equal treatment under 
Title IX.  
The advent of a new administration often provides the oppor-
tunity for reconsideration of existing policies, particularly where 
they have come under criticism by courts. The issuance of new reg-
ulations or guidance through proper administrative procedures that 
take appropriate account of the issues of fundamental procedural 
fairness outlined in this Article (and developed more fully in its 
companion piece, Ready, Fire, Aim)299 would be a welcome devel-
opment. 
There are worrying signs, however, that the Trump administra-
tion may change course in harmful ways.300 This Author has argued 
here and elsewhere that ensuring basic procedural fairness to the ac-
cused is fully compatible with—indeed, supportive of—treating the 
issue of campus sexual assault as a serious problem urgently in need 
of redress.301 Federal action pressing universities to enforce the 
guarantees of Title IX is entirely appropriate, so long as basic pro-
cedural rights inherent in the Constitution and in notions of funda-
mental fairness are respected. The Republican Party platform, on the 
other hand, seems to characterize the very idea of federal regulation 
of the way colleges and universities respond to campus sexual as-
sault as a “distortion” of Title IX and harmful federal “microman-
agement.”302 Moreover, there is some support among Trump advi-
sors for closing OCR down and transferring its functions to the Jus-
tice Department—actions that advocates for victims of campus sex-
ual assault fear would undercut efforts to effectively address the      
issue.303 
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That being said, the views on campus sexual assault adjudication 
of Betsy DeVos, President Trump’s newly sworn-in Secretary of 
Education, are not well known.304 Senator Bob Casey (D-Penn.) 
asked DeVos whether she would commit to keeping the DCL in 
place, but she refused to do so, saying it was “premature.”305 She 
also balked at promising Senator Patty Murray (D-Wa.) that she 
would allow OCR to continue its work investigating and enforcing 
rules against campus sexual assault.306 It is this Author’s hope that 
DeVos will use her power to address the DCL’s flaws without jetti-
soning federal efforts to press for an end to the serious problem of 
campus sexual assault. Unless and until then, it will be up to the 
courts to ensure that accused students receive the fair treatment that 
is being denied to them by their colleges and universities. 
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